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Abstract. In this paper I address an important question in Aristotle’s biology, What are
the causal mechanisms behind the transmission of biological form? Aristotle’s answer to
this question, I argue, is found in Generation of Animals Book 4 in connection with his
investigation into the phenomenon of inheritance. There we are told that an organism’s
reproductive material contains a set of ‘‘movements’’ which are derived from the various
‘‘potentials’’ of its nature (the internal principle of change that initiates and controls
development). These ‘‘movements,’’ I suggest, function as specialized vehicles for com-
municating the parts of the parent’s heritable form during the act of reproduction. After
exploring the details of this mechanism, I then take up Aristotle’s theory of inheritance
proper. At the heart of the theory are three general principles (or ‘laws’) that govern the
interactions between the maternal and paternal movements, the outcome of which
determines the pattern of inheritance for the offspring. Although this paper is primarily
aimed at providing a detailed analysis of Aristotle’s account of inheritance, the results of
that analysis have implications for other areas of Aristotle’s biology. One of the most
interesting of these is the question of whether Aristotle’s biology is anti-evolutionary (as
traditionally assumed) or whether (as I argue) it leaves room for a theory of evolution by
natural selection, even if Aristotle himself never took that step.
Keywords: Aristotle, Aristotle’s biology, Generation of Animals, genotype, phenotype,
inheritance, evolution, nature
Introduction
Among Aristotle’s most famous expressions is the often repeated mantra
‘‘human begets human’’ (‘‘horse begets horse,’’ etc.). But how does an
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Aristotelian form get passed on to an offspring in the act of reproduction?
What are themechanisms underlying the transmission of biological form? In
otherwords, how exactly does humanbeget human (horse beget horse, etc.)?
The most obvious place to look for an answer to this is Aristotle’s
Generation of Animals (GA). I shall argue that the actual mechanisms
behind the transmission of biological form are set out in Generation of
Animals 4.3 in connection with Aristotle’s theory of inheritance. This
paper is an attempt to offer a detailed account of that theory. Of course,
a complete analysis of Aristotle’s views on inheritance would require a
more lengthy discussion of the account of sex determination in GA 4.1-
2, as well as a discussion of the problem of maternal inheritance.1 In
addition to being central topics in Aristotle’s ontogeny (and thus nec-
essary parts of any study of the GA), these issues are necessary pre-
cursors to the discussion of inheritance in GA 4.3. For example, in GA
4.3 Aristotle appears to assign a formal contribution to the mother.
Many commentators have come to see this as being at odds with the
strict reproductive hylomorphism set out in the first three books
according to which the father provides the ‘‘form’’ while the mother
provides the ‘‘matter.’’2 Assuming the GA contains an internally
coherent theory, a proper understanding of the mechanisms involved in
the transmission of biological form (embodied in the phenomenon of
inheritance) would have to begin with a solution to this problem.
Unfortunately I do not have space to explore these other topics here.
For convenience I shall simply by-pass the discussionof sex determination
altogether. Moreover, I shall take it for granted that, in addition to pro-
viding the material out of which the offspring develops, Aristotle thinks
the female also makes a genetic contribution to reproduction.3 The scope
of this paper is limited to Aristotle’s general account of the mechanisms
of inheritance and how their operation serves to explain various patterns
of resemblance (including both individual and species resemblances). In
order to do that, it will be useful to introduce some terminology.
Two Senses of ‘‘Formal Nature’’
In several key passages in the Parts of Animals (PA) Aristotle divides the
‘‘nature’’ of a biological substance into its ‘‘material nature’’ and its
1 For a detailed account of these see Henry, 2004, Chapter 3 and 4 (respectively).
2 Morsink, 1982; Furth, 1988; Cooper, 1988.
3 For example, the female is responsible for the development of the offspring’s
nutritive soul (GA 2.5), as well as those aspects of its bodily form that make it look
individuals on her side of the family (GA 4.3, see esp. 768a15–21).
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‘‘formal nature.’’ The formal nature is then sub-divided into what he
calls nature ‘‘as mover’’ and nature ‘‘as end’’
4 I shall not deal with the concept of material nature in
any direct manner here. Roughly, the material nature of an organism
(or organic compound) refers to what it is made out of, its matter. The
formal nature is more important for my purposes, specifically the dis-
tinction between nature ‘‘as mover’’ and nature ‘‘as end.’’
An examination of the way Aristotle deploys these latter two con-
cepts reveals that nature ‘‘as end’’ picks out the organism’s fully
developed adult form while nature ‘‘as mover’’ refers to the productive
agent inside the developing embryo that directs the process towards that
form. For example, at PA 1.1, 640b23–8 an organism’s nature is iden-
tified with its shape configuration and visible
character Here ‘‘nature’’ clearly refers to the shape
and form of the adult organism (nature as end).5 On the other hand, GA
2.4, 740b25–741a3 uses the concept of nature to pick out the active
potential inside the embryo that is responsible
for generating the parts of the offspring’s body Here
Aristotle is talking about an organism’s nature understood as mover.
For convenience I will use the term ‘‘genetic nature’’ to refer to
nature understood as mover (the thing that generates) and ‘‘phenotypic
nature’’ to refer to nature understood as end (the visible form generated
by it). My choice of terminology here is certainly not arbitrary. For
when Aristotle distinguishes between the nature that generates and the
nature generated by it, he seems to be drawing roughly the same dis-
tinction modern biology makes between the genotype and the pheno-
type.6 Although these two concepts are not clearly defined even within
modern biology, the phenotype basically refers to an organism’s fully
developed morphology, physiology, behavior, etc. (what we might
generally call its observable form), while the genotype is the sum of
underlying genetic factors which are in some sense productive of those
phenotypic characters. To be sure, the extent to which the genotype is
causally responsible for the development of the phenotype remains
4 PA 1.1, 641a22–33 (cf. Physics 2.1).
5 Compare Metaphysics D4, 1015a3–12 where nature in this sense is explicitly iden-
tified with the form at the end of the process of development [sc.
).
6 This insight has also been recorded by Morsink (1982, 167). Gutie´rrez-Giraldo
(2001) makes the reverse claim that I am making here. He argues, not that Aristotle
made a distinction akin to the modern phenotype/genotype distinction, but that the
modern concept of the genotype counts as an Aristotelian I shall not evaluate
this interesting claim here.
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controversial. What is important for my purposes, however, is simply
the fact that modern biology recognizes a fundamental distinction
between the phenotypic characters of an organism and the genes that
underlie them.7 It is in this sense that I think the phenotype/genotype
distinction provides an effective model for understanding the relation
Aristotle envisions between nature ‘‘as end’’ and nature ‘‘as mover’’ and
the role that he assigns to each in his ontogeny.8
One of the things that led Aristotle to the distinction between the
observable features of an organism and the productive sources of those
features was the experiments he carried out on plants. Aristotle dis-
covered that if you pull off parts of the parent plant before seed pro-
duction, those missing parts will still show up in the seedling.9 Aristotle
took this as empirical proof that what is directly transmitted in the act
of reproduction is not the observable part of an organism (the pheno-
typic nature) but its underlying cause (the genetic nature).
Mechanisms of Inheritance
In Generation of Animals 4.3 Aristotle states that an adequate theory of
reproduction must explain at least eight different phenomena connected
with inheritance:
1. Offspring tend to resemble their parents more than other members of
the same species. (767a36–7)
2. Some offspring resemble the father while others resemble the mother,
both (a) as a whole and (b) with respect to different parts (e.g. an
offspring can have its father’s eyes and its mother’s nose). (767a37–
b1)
3. Offspring tend to resemble their parents more than their ancestors.
(767b2)
4. Offspring tend to resemble their ancestors more than any chance
individual of the same species. (767b2–3)
5. Usually males resemble their fathers and females their mothers.
(767b3–4)
6. Nevertheless, sometimes males resemble their mothers while females
resemble their fathers. (769a3–4, b5–6)
7 See, e.g., Laubichler and Wagner, 2000.
8 Eventually I shall argue that an organism’s genetic nature is comprised of several
different active potentials, each of which governs the development of a specific part of its
phenotypic nature.
9 GA 1.18, 722a11–14.
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7. Offspring who fail to resemble either its parents or its ancestors may
still look like a human being at any rate. (767b4–5)
8. In extreme cases the offspring’s observable form may
fail to bear any likeness to a human being, at which point it is a
monstrosity (767b5)
I shall consider Aristotle’s explanation for some of these later on (see
‘‘Aristotle’s Theory of Inheritance’’ below). My aim in this section is to
set out in detail the causal mechanism underlying Aristotle’s account of
them. My hope is that by grasping the details of this mechanism we shall
not only be in a better position to understand Aristotle’s theory of
inheritance itself but also, more generally, how he thinks biological
forms are transmitted from one generation to another in the act of
reproduction.
The primary goal of the chapter is to explain the inheritance of
features that make the offspring look like certain members of its own
family more than other individuals of the same species (e.g. nose shape,
eye color). As such, we can be sure that Aristotle thinks some features
below the level of species are included in the form that is transmitted in
the act of reproduction.10 However, Aristotle does not confine the
account of inheritance to these individual differences alone. What we
find is that the causal mechanism at work in GA 4.3 actually underwrites
the transmission of the species-form as well. For example, at GA 768a13
the mechanism is extended to include not only those properties that are
peculiar to Socrates as an individual but also those that are common to
all humans and animals (the universals).
The basic causal mechanism is introduced to us in the following
passage from GA 767b35–768a2 (cf. 768a11–14):
Therefore, there are present in the seeds <of animals>
derived from the of all of these sorts of things [e.g. male,
Socrates, human, 767b24–6; animal, 768a13], and in potentiality
even those of its ancestors, although those of the individual are
always closer.
The two central components of the mechanism identified in this text are
the which are said to be present in the parents’ seeds
and the
from which those are drawn (By ‘‘all
these sorts of things’’ Aristotle means those phenotypic characters that
are capable of being passed on in reproduction or, as Aristotle puts it,
10 See GA 767b24–30 (discussed below).
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those that belong to the organism insofar as it is capable of reproduc-
tion ( 767b23–9).) The main interpretive difficulty
that arises in connection with GA 4.3 is how to understand this mech-
anism. More specifically, what are the and
supposed to be?11
I shall begin by examining (and subsequently rejecting) two possible
interpretations of what Aristotle means by On the first
reading simply refers to a property which is predicated of
Socrates qua generator (it is a logical concept). The second reading also
identifies a with a property that belongs to the generator;
however, it takes Aristotle to be identifying actual bodily characteristics
rather than mere logical predicates (it has ontological significance).
Against these two readings I shall take the concept to retain its more
familiar sense of ‘‘potential’’ from Metaphysics 1–2 (causal power).12
On the reading I shall defend the refer to components of an
organism’s genetic nature, each of which is a potential for the formation
of a different part of its phenotypic nature. In this way each is
associated with a specific characteristic in the teleological sense: it is a
potential for that property.13
After identifying the nature of the I turn to the
which are said to be derived from them. All previous attempts to
understand Aristotle’s hereditary use of can be roughly divided
into three main readings (all of which are rejected here). The first
reading identifies the with the formative motions of Socrates’
sperm as it fashions the menstrual blood into parts of the offspring. On
the second reading, the in question are not formative motions
of the sperm but changes initiated in the menstrual blood by the sperm
(those that make up the embryo’s development). A third reading takes
the in question to be the very same motions and changes that
make up the process of development; however, unlike reading two, it
identifies them with things carried inside the sperm (as in a vessel). On
this reading the father’s sperm ‘‘imports’’ changes directly into the
menstrual blood, which then immediately set to work building that
material into a new organism of the same shape and form.
11 Until this question has been answered for each term I shall continue to employ the
Greek as placeholders.
12 For an excellent discussion of this sense of see Gotthelf, 1987, 209–211. A
simple example of an active would be fire’s power to melt iron. Iron has the
corresponding passive in virtue of which it is capable of being liquefied when
exposed to fire. See also Meteorologica 4.8–12.
13 By saying these are potentials for specific characters I mean that their activation
during development initiates a set of changes that terminate in those characters.
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In contrast to this, I shall argue that the in question refer to
distinct units of inheritance carried inside Socrates’ sperm. More spe-
cifically, they are information-bearing vehicles through which the parts of
Socrates’ form are physically transmitted to his offspring in the act of
reproduction. (How this reading differs from the above three will become
clear as we proceed.) This use of is not peculiar to Aristotle’s
theory of inheritance. As we shall see, we also find the concept being
used in this way in the account of sense perception in GA 5.
The
Just prior to GA 767b35–768a2 (at 767b23–6) Aristotle remarks on his
use of ‘‘I speak of each in the following sense. The
generator is not only a male but also a particular sort of male, for
example a Coriscus or a Socrates, and it is not only a Coriscus but also a
human being.’’ While this certainly provides a clue as to the repro-
ductive significance of a Aristotle appears to be offering
nothing more than a logical analysis of the concept here. If we take ‘‘the
generator’’ as the subject, Aristotle’s point in this passage
is that the predicates ‘‘male,’’ ‘‘Socrates,’’14 and ‘‘human being’’ all
belong to the generator insofar as it is capable of reproduction
and not accidentally
The examples of genetically accidental properties
are ‘‘being a good scholar’’ and ‘‘being someone’s neighbor’’ (b26–9).
Such properties are accidental to Socrates qua generator in the sense
that they are not part of his heritable form: they are not features which
are capable of being passed on in the act of reproduction. What 767b23–
9 makes perfectly clear, however, is that those properties that make
Socrates a unique individual (e.g. his particular shade of eye color and
distinctive nose shape) are part of his heritable form. They are among
those formal properties that belong to him
But how does this help us understand what a is in
this context? One of the meanings of that Peck lists in the
introduction to his translation of the GA is ‘‘distinctive characteris-
tic.’’15 This suggests that perhaps Aristotle is using in a logical
14 This stands for Socrates’ distinctive characteristics falling below the level of species
(his snub nose, blue eyes, etc.).
15 Peck, 1990, li (Section 26; cf. Section 27). Peck claims that Aristotle’s use of
in GA 4.3 reflects a specialized hereditary concept (liii, (Section 31)), though he
does not say how we are supposed to understand that specialized use.
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sense to refer to properties which are predicated of Socrates qua gen-
erator. On this first reading, 767b35–768a2 is simply pointing to the
presence of in Socrates’ sperm corresponding to those prop-
erties without making any claims about the actual presence of
in Socrates himself.
A quick glance at the text shows that Aristotle is quite clearly
thinking of things which have some sort of physical (as opposed to
logical) significance, things which are actually present in Socrates’ body.
For the are supposed to be the sources of the in his
sperm: the are ‘‘derived from’’ those 16
Moreover, this first reading takes ‘‘male,’’ ‘‘Socrates,’’ and ‘‘human
being’’ in 767b23–6 as the themselves, whereas 767b35–768a2
refers to the of these sorts of things. This implies some sort of
ontological distinction between the phenotypic characters and the
of those characters.
Coles offers a second interpretation which attempts to preserve the
identification of a with a property of the generator’s body
while at the same time respecting its ontological status as the source of a
corresponding in its seed. According to Coles, by referring to
the characteristics of Socrates’ body as Aristotle is
assigning those bodily characteristics both phenotypic and genetic sig-
nificance:
...the specific characteristics which make an individual what he is
are also responsible for reproducing other specific individuals.... So
to describe a characteristic of Socrates as a must be to
specify its particular hereditary significance as well as its pheno-
typic significance in characterizing Socrates.17
On Coles reading the same characteristics which are displayed in
Socrates’ phenotype are also the from which the in
Socrates’ sperm are drawn. For example, there is a in his sperm
corresponding to his snub nose which (on this reading) is drawn directly
from his nose itself. In this sense Socrates’ snub nose is both an actual
part of his body and the source of a change that terminates in that same
part in his offspring.
While I agree with Coles that the in question are the
sources of the in Socrates’ sperm, they cannot refer to the
actual parts of Socrates’ body themselves. First, I am not sure that this
16 Of course being derived from something as its source is not the only meaning of the
Greek ; however, it is the most common meaning and the most likely one here.
17 Coles, 1995, 73.
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reading leaves room for the distinction Aristotle makes between a
phenotypic character and the of that phenotypic character.
However, even if there is a way to preserve this distinction, Coles’
understanding of the hereditary concept of crucially depends
on his assumption that Aristotle accepted the central tenet of the Hip-
pocratic model of pangenesis, namely, that the capacity of sperm to
transmit formal resemblances derives from its ‘‘pansomatic’’ origin in
the parent’s body. And this is an extremely difficult reading to maintain.
Coles refers to Aristotle’s model as ‘‘formal pangenesis,’’ as opposed
to Hippocratic ‘‘material pangenesis.’’ According to Hippocratic material
pangenesis, the seed out of which the offspring grows is made of tiny bits of
tissue drawn from each part of the parent’s body.18 Coles wants to argue
that Aristotle picked up on this idea but held that instead of tiny bits of
tissue, the parent’s genetic material contains formal Coles
takes these to be quite literally local motions (not of the sperm
but inside the sperm) that preserve the shape and form of the parent’s
body.19 His idea is this. Socrates’ sperm is made from a residue of blood
that has (according to Coles) traveled around to every part of his body
during the nutritive cycle, the bit which is left over at the end of that cycle.
The which are carried inside his sperm are the very same (local)
motions that the blood underwent as it flowed around the contours of his
body during nutrition; those motions are (somehow?) preserved in his
sperm. Once inside the female, the sperm releases its motions into the
menstrual blood which then sketch out the parts of Socrates’ body by
retracing the path his blood followed as it traveled around his own body.20
It is in this sense, Coles argues, that the parts of Socrates’ body are
or sources of motion (‘‘parts can be sources or originators of
movements, it seems, because blood flows around each and every part’’).
There are several reasons why formal pangenesis cannot be sustained
as an interpretation of the GA. I shall confine myself to two.21
First, it is unclear why Aristotle’s arguments against pangenesis in
GA 1.17–18 should not also apply to so-called formal pangenesis. This is
especially pressing in cases where Aristotle’s attacks are focused not on
the idea that what is drawn from the parts is some material component
but on the idea that anything at all should be drawn from them. One
18 The assumption here is that those bits of tissue have the ability to regenerate themselves.
See GA 2.4, 740b12–18, 741b9–10.
19 This is an example of the third reading of discussed below.
20 Coles, 1995, 61ff.
21 In addition to these two arguments, there is sufficient textual evidence against Coles’
reading. See especially GA 1.18, 725a21–7; 1.19, 726b9–15.
ARISTOTLE ON THE MECHANISM 433
such argument appeals to his experiments with plants (722a11–14).
Aristotle says that if you remove the parts of a plant, the theory of
pangenesis predicts that those same parts will be absent from the off-
spring’s phenotype. For there will be nothing in the seed drawn from
those missing parts. Since this is not the case (the missing parts still
show up in the seedling), Aristotle concluded that the reproductively
significant units – whatever those might be – could not possibly be
derived from the actual parts of the parent’s body itself. This would
equally apply to a formal pangenesis. Coles’ reading predicts that if we
amputated Socrates’ legs prior to spermatogenesis, Menexenos would
be born without legs. For according to formal pangenesis there will be
no in Socrates’ sperm corresponding to those amputated parts.
For there are no such parts for his blood to flow around during the
nutritive cycle.
Second, formal pangenesis (like material pangenesis) will not be able
to account for the phenomenon of atavism, which Aristotle thinks any
adequate theory of inheritance must explain. This is the most significant
for my purposes here. Take the case of the woman from Elis, which
Aristotle uses in Book 1 to undermine pangenesis.22 The woman from
Elis, who was pale skinned, had a daughter with a man from Ethiopia,
who was dark skinned. Their daughter (call her Hypatia) was pale
skinned, but her son was dark skinned. (The assumption here is that
Hypatia’s husband was also pale skinned.) Aristotle’s theory explains
this by pointing to a in Hypatia’s seed derived from a corre-
sponding in herself (in accordance with 767b35–768a2).
Obviously the which is the source of the dark-skinned
does not refer to an actual characteristic of Hypatia’s body, since
Hypatia does not have dark skin.23
Either of these objections would suffice to show that Aristotle rejects
the idea that the reproductively significant units in an organism’s genetic
material are derived from the parts of its body. Accordingly, the
from which the spermatic are derived cannot be the
parts themselves.
Morsink offers a third possibility for understanding what the
in our text might be. According to Morsink, a is not
an actual phenotypic character but the causal power behind that
22 GA 1.18, 722a6–11.
23 Nor can this refer to a potential characteristic, unless that potentiality has a strong
ontological significance. For there must be some thing from which the corresponding
is drawn. I shall argue that this thing is a component of Hypatia’s genetic nature
(though one that is not actually expressed in her phenotypic nature). For Aristotle’s own
account of this case see below.
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character (presumably the power to produce that part of the organ-
ism).24 Though I think Morsink ultimately goes too far in calling these
‘‘the most basic components of an organism,’’25 this inter-
pretation at least takes us in the right direction. For it recognizes an
ontological distinction between an organism’s bodily characteristics and
the of those characteristics, which is implied by our focal text.
This distinction is critical for accommodating Aristotle’s rejection of the
panspermatic thesis in Book 1 (the thesis that the units of inheritance
are drawn directly from the parts of the body itself). For example, since
the in Socrates are not the actual parts of his body, there is
nothing preventing Aristotle from postulating a set of cor-
responding to the parts of Socrates’ ancestors. Moreover, this account is
not vulnerable to the objection raised by Aristotle’s plant experiments.
For the in an organism’s genetic material are derived from the
of its parts, which on the current reading are ontologically
distinct from the actual parts themselves. As such, removing the latter
would not affect the outcome of reproduction.
Although Morsink argues that by associating the characteristics of
Socrates’ body with Aristotle has extended the concept well
beyond its ordinary meaning, he essentially takes these to be active
potentials or causal powers. And this is one of the familiar senses of
from Metaphysics . The problem with Morsink’s reading is
that it takes the in question to be the reproductively signifi-
cant units carried inside Socrates’ sperm.26 However, GA 767b35–768a2
is explicit that what is transmitted inside Socrates’ sperm are not the
themselves but the derived from those So
the must refer to entities located in Socrates’ body, which are
nevertheless distinct from the bodily characteristics for which they are
The reading I shall defend can be seen as building on Morsink’s
insight. Following Morsink, I shall take ‘‘the of all these sorts
of things’’ to refer to the productive sources of an organism’s formal
characteristics.27 However, I shall argue that these are com-
ponents of the organism’s genetic nature (which for Aristotle are not
24 Morsink, 1982, 134. Morsink compares the phenotypic characters of an organism
to symptoms of underlying causes. He argues that what we find here is one of the earliest
recognitions of the difference between phenotype and genotype.
25 Morsink, 1982, 134–5. This claim implies a sort of genetic reductionism that I doubt
Aristotle would accept.
26 e.g. Morsink, 1982, 135.
27 I am assuming that by saying a is the ‘‘power behind’’ a given phenotypic
trait Morsink means (as I do) it is the productive source of that trait.
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directly transmitted in the parent’s seed). Each of these is a
separate potential for the formation of a specific part of its phenotypic
nature, not only those that make up its own observable form, but also
those that correspond to various properties of its ancestors (which are
not displayed in its observable form).
On my reading, the that comprise an organism’s genetic
nature play two distinct roles in Aristotle’s ontogeny. In the first place,
each serves a developmental function in the embryo as the
primary source of a change that terminates in some part of its pheno-
typic nature.28 However, we also know from our focal text that there are
in the seed of the adult organism which are derived from these
Thus, in addition to their developmental function, each
of the adult’s genetic nature will play a major role in repro-
ducing its phenotypic nature in another organism. I shall develop this
interpretation further once we have a clearer picture of the nature of
Aristotle’s spermatic
The
Having determined that the in our text are the active poten-
tials of an organism’s genetic nature, the next thing to determine is the
nature of the which are said to be derived from those poten-
tials. According to the most common interpretation of GA 4.3, the
in Socrates’ sperm are simply motions of his sperm as it
fashions the parts of the offspring’s body out of menstrual blood.29 On
this first reading, to say that there is a in Socrates’ sperm cor-
responding to his snub nose is just to identify the motion of his sperm in
fashioning that part of the offspring.
Although it is extremely tempting to read the text in this way
(especially since Aristotle refers to them as ‘‘demiurgic’’ movements,
768a15), this cannot be what Aristotle has in mind. For example, in the
closing argument of GA 2.1 Aristotle announces that ‘‘nothing generates
itself but once it has been generated it makes itself grow’’ (735a12–14; cf.
Movement of Animals 700a31–b4). It is supposed to follow from this
28 See, e.g., Physics 2.8, 199b13–18 (cf. Metaphysics 8, 1049b8–10). This is essen-
tially what an Aristotelian is, a source of change.
29 This reading is held by Furth (1988, see esp. 118–9) and Cooper (1988). For
example, Cooper (30) argues that the father is directly responsible for the shape and
form of the offspring’s entire body and that his sperm is ‘‘the instrument he uses to
move, fashion and shape the matter so as to have that form.’’
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that an animal’s heart must contain the source of growth and devel-
opment of necessity. And the reason is that the heart is differentiated
before any of the other parts. The implication of this argument is
twofold. First, an organism exists (it has come to be) as soon as its heart
has been differentiated and begins to function. Second, once this part
has been differentiated the embryo makes itself grow. Now by ‘‘makes
itself grow’’ Aristotle must mean that at this point the offspring becomes
responsible for constructing the rest of its body.30 Indeed, this is the
only reading that makes sense of Aristotle’s claim that the heart must
contain the principle of growth because it is the first part of the offspring
to be formed. For at that point the embryo must be able to take over the
job of building the rest of its body and so must of necessity contain the
generative principle.31
Since the offspring is responsible for the construction of its own body
(save for its heart), the that are said to be present in the father’s
sperm at GA 767b35–768a2 cannot be motions of his sperm as it literally
fashions the offspring out of menstrual blood. To say that there is a
in Socrates’ sperm corresponding to his snub nose cannot refer
to the motion of his sperm as it fashions the offspring’s nose; the sperm
is not responsible for fashioning that part.
A second interpretation, suggested by Morsink, identifies the
in question with the motions and changes that make up the
actual process of development itself. On this reading the
corresponding to Socrates’ snub nose just is the development of a nose.
The picture Morsink has in mind looks something like this. Among the
potentials that make up Socrates’ genetic nature is a potential for the
formation of a snub nose (of which his own nose is a product). During
reproduction this potential (or a copy of it) is transmitted to the female
inside Socrates’ sperm.32 Once there, that potential initiates a change
which terminates in a nose resembling Socrates.’
While I think this picture is right insofar as the changes that physically
transform the embryo into its adult form are initiated and controlled by a
corresponding set of potentials inside the embryo itself (the components
of its own genetic nature), these changes cannot be the Aristotle
30 Sometimes (e.g. GA 776a31–b3) Aristotle distinguishes morphogenesis – the pri-
mary differentiation of the offspring’s major structures – from growth-proper – the
period immediately following this when those newly formed structures are merely
augmented. However, ‘‘growth’’ can also be used to cover both of these
stages (e.g. GA 740a1). This is how I take Aristotle to be using the term in the present
context.
31 This is confirmed later at 740b25–741a3.
32 Morsink, 1982, 135.
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has in mind in GA 767b35–768a2. For those are said to be pres-
ent in Socrates’ sperm (
768a11–14, b7–8: while the changes that make up the process of
development are located in the menstrual blood.33
Whatever the spermatic turn out to be, Aristotle is clearly
referring to things which are present inside Socrates’ sperm (presum-
ably) while in transit into the female. This suggests a third reading: the
sperm acts as a vessel for carrying the changes that make up the process
of development into the female.34 Although there are texts that seem to
suggest this (e.g. GA 734b7–9, 737a18–24), this interpretation encoun-
ters several difficulties.
For example, at GA 768a11–14 we are told that some of the
in the Socrates’ sperm are present ‘‘in actuality’’ while
others are only ‘‘in potentiality’’ (cf. 767b35, 768b5–7). According to
this third reading, the which are present in Socrates’ sperm
while in transit are the very same motions and changes that make up
the process of development. If some of those changes are present ‘‘in
actuality,’’ then they must be actual changes of Socrates’ sperm,
which implies that Socrates’ sperm is actually changing (e.g. it is
actually developing a snub nose). The problem with this is that
Aristotle denies that the father’s sperm is the subject of change: it is
not the thing that develops into the adult at the end of the process
(see esp. GA 1.21).
On the other hand, the idea that Socrates’ sperm ‘‘imports’’ changes
directly into the female which are not actual changes of his sperm is a
33 Another suggestion is that the father’s sperm is the mover and the is the
activity of that mover (e.g. a process of development effected by the sperm). However, a
central tenet of Aristotle’s physics is that the activity of the agent and patient constitute
a single motion (though differing in account) and that this motion is located in the
patient (Physics 3.3). There is one way of understanding as the activity of the
agent which does take place in the agent. At GA 2.4, 740b26ff. Aristotle says that,
properly speaking, the products of art are formed by the motions of the craftsman’s
tools and that these motions are the activity of the art. Moreover, GA 1.22, 730b8ff. tells
us that the father’s nature uses the sperm ‘‘as a tool possessing motion in actuality’’ just
as tools are moved when things are being formed in art: ‘‘for the motion of the art is in
these things.’’ However, this cannot be read in connection with the spermatic
from GA 4.3. For that would amount to saying the father’s nature uses the sperm to
fashion the parts of the offspring (reading one), which is something Aristotle denies.
Given the context, what is more likely is that Aristotle is simply referring to the sperm’s
causal role in the process of fertilization, not in constructing the parts of the offspring’s
body.
34 Balme. 1972, 157; 1987a, 281–2; 1987b, 292; Coles, 1995 (see above); cf. King, 2001,
29.
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very unAristotelian notion. For Aristotelian changes cannot be sepa-
rated from their subject in this way (there are no free-floating chan-
ges).35 Thus, we cannot speak of the motions and changes that make up
the process of development (which are eventual changes of the men-
strual blood) as being transported inside the sperm as in a vessel.36
So far I have considered three possibilities for what the spermatic
in GA 4.3 could be:
1. Motions of Socrates’ sperm as it fashions the parts of the offspring
out of the menstrual blood.
2. Changes of the menstrual blood initiated by active potentials carried
inside Socrates’ sperm.
3. Changes of the menstrual blood initiated by active potentials in
Socrates’ body and carried into the female inside his sperm.
I have rejected reading 1 on the grounds that it is inconsistent with
one of the central tenets of the GA (the offspring is responsible for the
construction of its own body). The problem with reading 2 is that the
in question are supposed to be present in Socrates’ sperm while
the from which they are drawn are located in his body. Nor
does it seem reasonable to suggest that Socrates’ sperm might contain
actual changes which are not actual changes of his sperm (something
Aristotle categorically denies). In light of this, I want to propose a
fourth reading of the text:
4. The spermatic are specialized vehicles through which an
organism’s form is physically transmitted to its offspring in the act of
reproduction.37
This is the reading I shall defend. For lack of a better translation I
shall simply use ‘‘movement’’ to refer to these entities. However, it
should be stressed that by calling them ‘‘movements’’ I do not mean to
suggest they are to be identified with any of the motions or changes
that eventually transform the menstrual blood into the parts corre-
sponding to those movements (they are not pre-set motions or changes).
35 See Physics 3.3, 200b32: ‘‘There is no such thing as change over-and-above the
things [sc. the subjects of change];’’ and 201a1–3: ‘‘Hence, neither will motion and
change have reference to something over-and-above the things mentioned; for there is
nothing over-and-above them.’’ See also Metaphysics Z1, 1028a20–31.
36 If by saying the sperm imports ‘‘preset’’ changes into the menstrual blood we mean
potential changes, then this still leaves those actual changes unexplained.
37 Gotthelf (1987, 216 n. 20) suggests something akin to this.
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These spermatic movements are information-bearing vehicles of some
kind.38
There is one other interpretation that I have not yet considered
which would take the spermatic to be local motions like
vibrations or wave-motions.39 This is consistent with my reading,
since these vibrations or waves would still have to be information-
bearing vehicles that somehow encode the phenotypic characters they
transmit. My own view is that Aristotle’s theory inheritance is meant
to be more abstract than this, and so we should expect the concepts
deployed in GA 4.3 to be equally abstract. If this is right, then
Aristotle’s spermatic would be more like Mendel’s ‘‘gene’’
in the sense that both concepts attempt to abstract away from the
concrete, physical basis of the vehicles of inheritance.
It is important to note that in taking the word to refer to a
vehicle for conveying biological form I have not extended its meaning
beyond the Aristotelian corpus. We also find this use of in the
account of sense-perception in GA 5. There Aristotle deploys a concept
of a which refers to a vehicle for conveying an object’s sensible
form from the object to the perceiver.40 For example, at GA 780a27–31
Aristotle says the thickness of the membrane around the eye-jelly (the
organ of sight) can affect the direction of the ‘‘coming into the
eye from without’’ and whether or not it ‘‘passes straight
through’’ the membrane . Again, at 780b34 Aristotle
refers to a ‘‘coming from distant objects’’ and
‘‘arriving at’’ the perceiver’s sense organs. The use of
directional terms which ascribe locomotion to a suggests that
38 Witt (1985, 56 n. 26) also suggests that the spermatic movements are information-
bearing vehicles, though she does not clarify what she means by this. For the idea of a
bearing informational content see Aristotle On Memory (e.g. 452b23–4: ‘‘the
of the fact’’ and ‘‘the of the time’’). The primary difference between my
reading and reading 3 lies in the function assigned to the . The third readings
identifies the with pre-set motions and changes that directly produce the parts
of the offspring after being released into the menstrual blood. In contrast to this, I shall
argue that the function of the spermatic is to directly reproduce the
which are the sources of those developmental changes.
39 This interpretation was originally suggested to me by James Lennox (personal
correspondence). It was also suggested by one anonymous referee who called these
‘‘micro-physical motions.’’
40 Many of those who commented on earlier drafts of this paper suggest that Aris-
totle’s use of can also be understood (in the words of one anonymous referee)
‘‘without really reaching beyond the sense of the term as elucidated by Aristotle in the
Physics (particularly, Physics 3).’’ This is especially true if the turn out to be
micro-physical motions.
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Aristotle is speaking about a vehicle that physically transmits the sen-
sible properties of an object through the medium. For here
does not refer to the motion (or change) of something traveling but the
thing which is itself in motion.
The sensory in GA 5 are not only subjects of locomotion.
They are also subjects of other sorts of physical changes, such as being
broken up into pieces. At GA 780b13–781a12 Aristotle introduces a
mechanism whose function is to collect the sensory coming
from distant objects and funnel them into the perceiver’s eyes. He tells
us that the concavity of an animal’s brow literally shapes a portion of
air between its eyes and the perceived object into a kind of ‘‘tube’’
The further this tube extends, the more accurately the object is
seen:
Things at a distance, then, would be seen best if there were, so to
speak, a continuous tube extending straight from the eyes to the
object seen, for then the movements coming from the object would
not be dissipated; but, if that isn’t possible, still the further the tube
extends the more accurately distant objects must be seen. (781a8–
12)
Aristotle’s idea is this. The sensory coming from a distant object
begins to dissipate or break up almost immediately. How
accurately that object is seen depends on the concentration of the signal
the when it reaches the perceiver’s eyes. The more of the
that reaches the organ, the more clearly that object will be seen.
This is where the perceptual tube comes in (the portion of shaped-air
extending from the eye). The tube functions as a mechanism for col-
lecting the coming from objects, which are then passed on to
the organ where they produce sensation. And only those that
enter the visual tube will reach the eye (cf. 780b18–21).41 In this way the
ability of an animal to see objects at a distance becomes a function of
the length of its visual tube, which is in turn determined by the depth
and shape of its ocular cavity. Thus, Aristotle says, animals with sunken
eyes placed in a hollowed recess are able to see things at a distance
‘‘because the does not get scattered cf. 781b11:
but goes straight to the mark’’ (780b35–781a2).42
41 At GA 780b21–2 Aristotle remarks that this is why people in pits and wells can
sometimes see the stars (a satirical reference to Thales’ reputation for falling in wells?).
42 Aristotle’s perceptual ‘‘tubes’’ are not confined to vision. In GA 5.2 he discusses
how the same mechanism accounts for the ability to smell and hear distant objects
(781b7–16).
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The fact that the sensory are themselves subjects of verbs
of motion and change
strongly suggests that in the present con-
text a is a vehicle for carrying sensory information to the perceiver
about the object from which it came.
There is a nontrivial similarity between Aristotle’s genetic use of
in GA 4.3 and the use of in GA 5.1 as a vehicle for
transmitting the sensible properties of an object. While at first glance
the two may appear to be quite different events, from one perspective
inheritance and perception are instances of the same general phe-
nomenon. For they both involve the transmission of form without
matter. It is well-known that Aristotle characterizes perception in the
De anima as an event involving the transmission of an object’s sen-
sible form without its matter. In Generation of Animals 5 we are given
the mechanism that underlies this event. There we are told that the
formal properties of an object (e.g. its color) are conveyed from the
object to the perceiver by means of ‘‘movements.’’ Likewise, one of
the central features of Aristotle’s theory of reproduction is the idea
that the father transmits his form to the offspring without transmitting
any of his matter. And just as in the case of perception, we find
Aristotle appealing to ‘‘movements’’ in Socrates’ sperm that transmit
that form.
What Happens at the Receiving End?
Up to this point the discussion has focused exclusively on what happens
at the transmission end of the process (which is what we get in passages
like GA 767b35–768a2). According to the interpretation developed here,
an organism’s form is transmitted to its offspring by means of ‘‘move-
ments,’’ which are said to be present in its seed. These movements are
derived from the various ‘‘potentials’’ of its genetic nature, each of
which is the productive source of a different part of the animal’s phe-
notypic nature. The final step in the analysis is to ask what happens at
the receiving end of this transmission when those movements reach the
embryo. Although Aristotle never addresses this question directly, I
think we can speculate as to a possible answer.
In order to bridge the gap between Aristotle’s account of natural
generation in the Physics and his analysis of the mechanisms of inher-
itance in GA 4.3 we must assume that the reception of the spermatic
movements derived from potentials in the parent’s body, on the one
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hand, and the subsequent development of the offspring’s body, on the
other, are interposed by the formation of a new set of potentials: those
that make up the offspring’s own genetic nature. For the only way that
the process of development will count as ‘‘natural’’ (according to
Aristotle) is if all of the changes that make up that process originate
directly in a set of potentials in the embryo itself (cf. Metaphysics 8,
1049b9–11).43
Assuming Socrates’ son, Menexenos, is a naturally generated
organism, the construction of his body must have been preceded by the
formation of his genetic nature. This principle functions as a source of
change in Menexenos himself. It follows from this that the movements
transmitted inside Socrates’ sperm cannot be those that make up the
process of Menexenos’ development (reading 3). First, if the movements
imported into the menstrual blood by Socrates’ sperm immediately set
to work building Menexenos’ body, then there would have been no time
for the formation of his genetic nature. Second, those spermatic
movements would be derived from the potentials of Socrates’ genetic
nature, which would be a principle of change in another. In that case it is
not clear how Aristotle could distinguish Menexenos from a mere
artifact.
Morsink’s reading (reading 2) would avoid both of these problems.
According to Morsink the potentials of Socrates’ genetic nature (or
copies of them) are carried directly into the embryo inside his sperm.
Once there, these potentials are activated, which causes the matter to
develop into an organism resembling Socrates in every respect. After all,
they are (copies of) potentials of Socrates’ genetic nature. The problem
is that, while these potentials would count as sources of change in
Menexenos himself, Aristotle is explicit that what is carried into the
female inside Socrates’ sperm are not the potentials of his nature but
movements derived from those potentials.
An alternative answer (arising out of reading 4) is that the function
of the spermatic movements is to directly reproduce the active potentials
from which they were originally derived. On this reading Menexenos
will resemble Socrates to the extent that the potentials reproduced by
the movements in Socrates’ sperm are copies of those in Socrates’ own
43 The main difference between natural generation and artificial production for
Aristotle is that the former is initiated and controlled by a principle in the thing itself (its
nature) while the source of the latter change is in another individual (the art in the
craftsman). Cases like a doctor healing herself (which is an artificial change) complicate
the story but do not significantly alter the point.
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genetic nature. For each of the latter is a distinct potential for the
formation of a different part of Socrates’ body.
Aristotle’s Theory of Inheritance
Now that the mechanisms are in place let me finally turn to the theory of
inheritance proper. I shall leave most of the details aside here and in-
stead provide a general overview of that theory. The theory itself con-
sists of three ‘‘general suppositions’’ 44
formulated succinctly at GA 768b5–10:
We must grasp the general suppositions, not only the one stated – (1)
that among the movements present in the parents’ seeds some
are present in potentiality while others are present in activity – but
also two others: (2) being dominated causes displacement into
the opposite
while (3) relapsing causes a change into the movement which
stands next to it <on the blood-line>
If it relapses a little, it passes into the
movement which stands closer; if it relapses a lot, it passes into
the one farther away.
Supposition one concerns the existence of movements in the genetic
material of all sexually reproducing animals, some of which are ‘‘in
activity’’ while others are ‘‘in potentiality.’’ The other two supply the
principles (or ‘laws’) that govern the interactions between the maternal
and paternal movements. The outcome of those interactions determines
the pattern of inheritance for the particular offspring.
Having an account of the general contents of the parent’s genetic
material will make it easier to set out Aristotle’s theory of inheritance.
GA 768a11–14 is an important text in this respect:
Some of the movements are present in <the father’s sperm> in
activity while others are in potentiality: in activity, those of the
father and the universals (e.g. human and animal); in potentiality,
those of the ancestors.45
44 Lennox has suggested (personal correspondence) that the use of here
probably reflects its scientific meaning from the Analytics (e.g. An. Po. 72a15ff.).
45 Reading
I argued for this emendation in Henry, 2004, Chapter 4.
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Here Aristotle divides the paternal movements into three general groups:
those of the father those of the universal
and those of the ancestors 46
Those of the first two groups are said to be ‘‘in activity’’ while those of the
third group are ‘‘in potentiality.’’ I shall return to this distinction later.
The movements ‘‘of the father’’ include two sets of movements, one
for the sexual morphology proper to a male and another for those
features of Socrates’ phenotype that make him a unique individual.
Both of these movements are derived from potentials of Socrates’ ge-
netic nature which correspond to those parts of his phenotype (768a
28–9: and
In order to explain why some offspring resemble the father while
others resemble the mother with respect to different parts (see above:
phenomenon 2b) Aristotle postulates movements in the parents’ seeds
corresponding to each of their several parts (768b1–5). Each part-
movement is itself a discrete unit of inheritance that can undergo
‘‘displacement’’ and ‘‘relapse’’ independently of the other movements in
the set. This raises several difficult part-whole puzzles that would take us
too far outside of the immediate project. To avoid unnecessary com-
plications, I shall simply talk about the movement of ‘‘Socrates’’ (the
movement for the whole) as being made up of the movements for the
parts of Socrates. On this reading, resemblance to Socrates as a whole
occurs when all of the several part-movements dominate together
(though individually).
Although I shall not defend this here, I take it that ‘‘the movement
coming of Socrates’’ is responsi-
ble for transmitting all of the peculiar details of Socrates’ form, the
color of his eyes, the shape of his nose, and so forth. The movement
‘‘human,’’ on the other hand, will be responsible for transmitting those
species-level properties, such as the basic organization of the body, the
production of human-specific tissues and organs, and any other features
that are characteristic of that particular kind of animal.47 Finally, the
universal movement ‘‘animal’’ is responsible for the inheritance of the
parts of the sensory system, which is the feature that makes something
an animal (its essence).
46 The same applies to the maternal movements as well (GA 768a19–21, 768b13–15),
although Aristotle’s reproductive hylomorphism implies that ‘‘animal’’ will only be
present in the father’s sperm. In other words, the father’s genetic contribution alone is
causally responsible for the development of the offspring’s sensory system, which is the
form of an animal in the strict sense.
47 Compare the analogy with an artist at GA 2.6, 743b20–5.
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By postulating a set of movements in the parent’s seed for conveying
resemblances to other members of its family (the movements of the third
group), Aristotle was able to account for the fact that offspring who do
not resemble their parents tend to resemble their ancestors rather than
any chance individual (phenomenon 4). However, the fact that these
movements are only in potentiality while those corresponding to the
parent’s own phenotype are in activity is supposed to explain why off-
spring tend to resemble their parents more than their ancestors (phe-
nomenon 3). I shall have more to say about this later. For it is not
exactly clear what it means to say that some of the movements in the
parent’s seed are ‘‘in potentiality’’ while others are ‘‘in activity.’’
However this distinction is cashed out, the way it figures into Aristotle’s
theory of inheritance is clear. The ancestor movements become active
whenever the parental movements undergo relapse.
Suppositions Two and Three: ‘‘Displacement’’ and ‘‘Relapse’’
The real meat of Aristotle’s theory of inheritance is expressed by sup-
positions two and three:
Principle of Displacement: being dominated causes displacement into
the opposite movement
Principle of Relapse: relapse causes a change into the movement
which stands next to it on the blood-line
Taking a movement in Socrates’ sperm as a reference point, there are
three things that can happen to it: that movement can dominate
; it can be dominated ; or it can undergo relapse
. According to supposition two, being dominated causes dis-
placement into the opposite movement, while relapsing causes a change
into the movement which stands next to it (supposition three).
We are already familiar with the principle of relapse. If the move-
ment corresponding to Socrates’ nose relapses, the potential movement
in his sperm corresponding to his father’s nose is activated (becomes
). In this case Menexenos inherits his grandfather’s nose. If
Socrates’ nose-movement relapses back two generations, Menexenos
will inherit his great-grandfather’s nose, and so forth down the blood-line.
The principle of displacement is somewhat more complicated than
this, since Aristotle only says that being dominated causes ‘‘displace-
ment into the opposite.’’ This gives us a general idea of how the prin-
ciple of displacement affects the outcome of inheritance. If displacement
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occurs with respect to a property on the father’s side, then the offspring
will come to display the maternal version of the trait in which dis-
placement occurred (and vice versa). However, the two principles of
Aristotle’s theory are supposed to govern the behavior of the causal
mechanism that underlies the phenomena. And how displacement
works at this level is extremely vague. Specifically, it is not clear what
exactly changes to the opposite.
Although I will not offer a detailed defense of this, I take it that
dominance in this context expresses a relation between opposite sper-
matic movements (the vehicles of inheritance).48 On this reading both
suppositions two and three refer to changes between spermatic move-
ments. Displacement causes inheritance to change from the movements
of one parent to those of the other (a change between movements on
opposite blood-lines), while relapse causes it to change from the
movements of the parent to those of the ancestor (a change between
movements on the same blood-line).
Putting all of this together, if Socrates’ nose-movement dominates,
Menexenos will come to have the same nose as his father. However, if
this movement is dominated, then it gets displaced which causes
inheritance to switch over to Xanthippe’s nose-movement (a change
between movements on opposite blood-lines).49 In this case Menexenos’
nose will resemble his mother’s not his father’s. However, if Xanthippe’s
movement relapses, it passes into the movement of her mother (a change
between movements on the same blood-line). When that happens
Menexenos will come to have the same nose as his maternal grand-
mother.
Despite its brilliance, one of the shortcomings of Aristotle’s theory is
that it appears to lack any means for explaining how we get resemblance
to the father’s female ancestors or the mother’s male ancestors. This
phenomenon, which would have been just as obvious as those Aristotle
48 The text appears to be inconsistent on this. On the one hand, GA 768a2–5 says that
which is not dominated changes into the opposite. Here Aristotle is
referring to the embryo (or the matter supplied by the female). On the other hand, the
official formulation of the principle of displacement at GA 768b7–8 says that which is
dominated changes into the opposite. The inconsistency can be avoided
by assuming that the principle of displacement at GA 768b7–8 refers to the spermatic
movements themselves. In this case supposition two can be read as supplying the causal
mechanism behind the phenomenon described at GA 768a2–5. When the movement of
the father is dominated (alternatively, when the mother’s movement dominates),
inheritance automatically switches over to the opposite movement coming from the
mother. It will be the dominance of this movement that ultimately explains why the
embryo develops the opposite maternal trait.
49 Xanthippe was Socrates’ wife.
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discusses, cannot be explained by the principles the theory currently
posits. For example, the principle of displacement explains how we get
from movements on the father’s side to movements on the mother’s
side, while the principle of relapse explains how we get from those of the
father to those of his grandfather. What we need is an additional
principle that works in combination with relapse. Relapse would cause
inheritance to shift from the father’s movements to his father’s move-
ments while this third principle, working in conjunction with relapse,
would cause it to switch from his paternal ancestors to his maternal
ancestors.
Supposition One: Actual versus Potential Movements
The final task in providing a general overview of Aristotle’s theory of
inheritance is to provide an account of supposition one. According to
the first supposition of Aristotle’s theory, some of the movements car-
ried in the parent’s genetic material are ‘‘in activity’’ (those of the parent
and universals) while others are ‘‘in potentiality’’ (those of the ances-
tors). I shall ignore the universal movements and concentrate on the
active parental movements, on the one hand, and the potential ancestor
movements, on the other.
By postulating a set of movements corresponding to the parent’s
ancestors Aristotle was able to account for the fact that offspring who
do not resemble their parents nevertheless resemble one of their
ancestors rather than some chance individual (phenomenon 4). The fact
that these ancestor movements are ‘‘in potentiality’’ while those of the
parent are ‘‘in activity’’ is supposed to explain why offspring tend to
resemble their parents more than their ancestors (phenomenon 3). While
this may seem straightforward on the face of it, supposition one is
actually quite puzzling.
On the reading I am defending, the in Socrates’ sperm are
separate entities carried inside the sperm: they are the vehicles through
which Socrates’ form is physically transmitted to his offspring in the act
of reproduction. For Aristotle, it is the possession of these hereditary
units that gives Socrates’ sperm the capacity to generate formal
resemblances. A thorough analysis of the puzzle about ‘‘potential’’
movements would require much more space than I can afford it here.
My own understanding of the text is that by saying the ancestor
movements in Socrates’ sperm are ‘‘in potentiality’’ Aristotle means
they are present in a kind of de-activated state. They become active
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whenever the movements corresponding to Socrates’ own
features undergo relapse.50
Whether or not this is the proper way to understand supposition one,
any interpretation of Aristotle’s theory must allow that there really are
movements in Socrates’ sperm corresponding to the features of his
ancestors. They are not just there potentially in the sense that I am
potentially (but not actually) in Manchester. For Aristotle not only
needs to explain why Socrates’ sperm does not actually have the ability
to generate features that make his offspring look like Coriscus (a non-
familial relation); he also needs to account for the fact that it does not
even potentially have that ability. It is the fact that Socrates’ sperm
really does contain ancestor movements (they are actual entities inside
Socrates’ sperm) that grounds its capacity to generate features of those
individuals who are, after all, just as removed from the current act of
reproduction as any chance individual.
The Transmission of Biological Form: A Summary
In GA 4.3 Aristotle sets out the causal mechanism behind the trans-
mission of biological form. There we are told that an organism’s seed
contains a set of derived from corresponding
within itself (767b35–768a2). According to the interpretation developed
here, these are the components of its genetic nature, each of
which is a distinct potential for the formation of a given phenotypic
character (including potentials for the formation of characters which are
not displayed in its form). I have argued that the spermatic movements
are the vehicles through which an organism’s form is physically trans-
mitted in the act of reproduction. Finally, I have argued that in order to
bridge the gap between Aristotle’s transmission genetics and his account
of natural generation we must assume that the reception of spermatic
movements from the parents, on the one hand, and the subsequent
transformation of the embryo into its adult form, on the other, are
interposed by the formation of new potentials like those from which the
movements were originally drawn. Together these new potentials make
up the offspring’s own genetic nature, which constitutes a source of
change in the thing itself qua itself, thereby satisfying the conditions for
natural generation.
50 For a defense of this reading see Henry, 2004, Chapter 6, x 5. Something like this
reading is also suggested by Cooper, 1988, 23.
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It follows from all of this that for each part of the offspring’s phe-
notypic nature its genetic nature will contain two potentials (or two
versions of the same generic potential), one corresponding to each
spermatic movement received from its parents.51 Since these will be
potentials for the formation of contrary properties (e.g. snub nose
versus straight nose), only one of them can be expressed in the off-
spring’s phenotype at any given time. What I want to suggest here is
that which version of a given potential gets activated at the appropriate
stage of the embryo’s development, and thus which version is eventually
expressed in its phenotype, is determined by whichever parent’s move-
ment corresponding to that potential dominates over the
other according to the principles of displacement and relapse.52
This interpretation of the events in Generation of Animals 4.3 can be
supported by appealing once again the case of the woman from Elis.
Recall the example. The woman from Elis, who is pale-skinned, has a
pale-skinned daughter with a dark-skinned man from Ethiopia. Their
daughter (call her Hypatia) then has a dark-skinned child with another
pale-skinned man. According to Aristotle’s theory of inheritance, we
first explain why Hypatia has pale skin rather than dark skin by
pointing to the dominance of the pale-skin movement coming from her
mother over the dark-skin movement coming from her father. The
explanation for why her own son has dark skin is two-fold. First, the
paternal pale-skin movement coming from Hypatia’s husband is dominated,
which causes inheritance to switch over to Hypatia’s own pale-skin movement
according to the principle of displacement. This movement then relapses into
her father’s dark-skin movement, which was present in her seed in a state of
potentiality. The implication of this is that (looking back to the first genera-
tion) the defeated dark-skin movement coming from Hypatia’s father must
have still produced a corresponding potential in her genetic nature. For each
movement in Hypatia’s genetic material will have been derived from a cor-
responding potential in herself (in accordance with GA 767b35–768a2). It
follows from this that Hypatia’s genetic nature must contain two potentials for
skin color, one for pale skin (the produced by the coming
51 This follows from the fact that Aristotle’s theory posits a set of coming
from both parents which are functionally equivalent to one another (see, e.g., GA 4.3,
768a15–21). Thus for each potential, the offspring receives two movements, one from
the mother and one from the father.
52 See, e.g., GA 4.3, 768a28ff.: ‘‘And if the movement derived from ‘male’ dominates
but the movement derived from ‘Socrates’ does not dominate [i.e. if the movement
derived from ‘Xanthippe’ dominates], or vice versa, then the result is a male offspring
resembling its mother or a female offspring resembling its father (respectively).’’ The
passage continues to describe what happens if these movements relapse.
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from her mother) and one for dark skin (the produced by the
coming from her father). However, since her phenotypic nature
cannot display both versions of that trait simultaneously, only one of the
potentials will have been activated during her development; the other must be
preserved in her genetic nature in a de-activated state.
If this is right, then one spermatic movement ‘‘dominating’’ over
another does not determine which potential corresponding to those
movements makes it into the offspring’s genetic nature. Aristotle’s
account of atavism requires that both spermatic movements produce
potentials in its nature. Rather, what the dominance relation must
determine is which of those two potentials gets activated at the appro-
priate stage of development and thus which version of the trait is
expressed in the offspring’s phenotypic nature.
Is Aristotle’s Biology Anti-evolutionary?
One of the important features of this study is that it can be used to shed
new light on the question of whether or not Aristotle’s biology is anti-
evolutionary as traditionally assumed. Specifically, it allows us to ask in
much more detail questions about Aristotle’s views on the possibility of
heritable genetic mutations.53
At GA 768b10 (cf. 769b9–10) Aristotle tells us that disruptions in
the normal pattern of inheritance may result when the spermatic move-
ments become ‘‘confused together’’ On my interpreta-
tion, these ‘‘confused’’ movements will produce mutated potentials in the
offspring’s genetic nature.54 And those mutations will be heritable. For in
that case there will be movements in the offspring’s own genetic mate-
rial derived from those mutated potentials (in accordance with GA
767b35–768a2). This opens up theoretical space for an evolution by
natural selection. Of course even if this is right Aristotle either did not
recognize it or did not appreciate its implications. For while his account
of the mechanisms of inheritance might leave room for evolution, this is
53 Of course evolution can occur even without genetic mutations, as long there is a
sufficient amount heritable variation already available. Genetic mutations are really
only necessary for the possibility of building new structures through cumulative selec-
tion.
54 Compare De sensu 4, 446b6–10. Aristotle says that sometimes when a person speaks
the transmitting the sound undergoes a physical transformation in mid-air. The
result is that the letters of the word get jumbled (in mid-air) and the listener hears
something different than the speaker intended.
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not something Aristotle actually entertained. But is this something
Aristotle could even accept?
First of all, I don’t think the theoretical barrier here is Aristotle’s famous
rainfall argument at the beginning of Physics 2.8, which many take to be an
explicit rejection ofEmpedocles’ ideas about natural selection.Whatever it is
about Empedocles’ suggestion that Aristotle thinks is implausible there, it is
not his account of the origin of species.55 Rather, the problem I have inmind
is Aristotle’s belief in the fixity of species, which he argues for inGA 2.1 and
DA 2.4. Aristotle clearly does think that species are ‘‘eternal’’ and
‘‘unchanging’’ in some sense. And this would certainly appear to be anti-
thetical to an evolutionary world-view. But what is not clear iswhyAristotle
thinks species are eternal. Leaving this question aside for a moment, let us
consider whether or not Aristotle’s account of inheritance taken by itself is
compatible with Darwin’s theory of natural selection. One way to test this
idea is to look at the essential features of Darwin’s theory and see if any of
them are incompatible with Aristotle’s biology.
Compatibility with Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection
requires at least five essential features:56
1. Organic populations must be part of an ancestor-descendant history.
2. The members of such populations must inherit traits from their
ancestors and pass them on to their descendants.
3. They must also vary with respect to those heritable traits.
4. There must be a struggle for existence in which the members of
populations compete for limited environmental resources.
5. The environment in which they live must be infinitely complex and
subject to change.
Given these facts, Darwin argued that it is extremely likely that some
of the heritable variations in a population will give their possessors an
edge in the struggle for existence by increasing their ability to survive
55 The crucial line in the argument is Physics 198b34: ‘‘Yet, it is impossible for things
to be this way.’’ What way? Most commentators take Aristotle to be referring to
Empedocles’ idea that contemporary species were forged through a combination of
chance and natural selection. However, Aristotle goes on to explain, ‘‘For these and
all the things that exist by nature come to be in a given way either always or for the most
part, while not one of the results of luck or spontaneity do.’’ This suggests that
Aristotle is concerned with normal patterns of development for members of already
existing species (e.g. the normal development of human teeth). His point is that the
kind of explanations that Empedocles likes to give, which mostly appeal to chance,
cannot explain the remarkable constancy of biological development. Compare Gen-
eration and Corruption 2.6.
56 The following is adapted from Lennox’s analysis of Darwin in Salmon et al., 1999,
271.
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and reproduce. As a result of this increased ability, organisms with
those advantageous variants will tend to leave a disproportionate
number of offspring in successive generations. Eventually this will lead
to a gradual change in the population as a whole, with more favorable
traits accumulating over generations.57
Clearly Aristotle’s biology is compatible with (1), (2), and (4). First,
Aristotle has an historical concept of species. In Metaphysics D28, for
example, a biological species is defined as a ‘‘continuous generation of
individuals of the same form.’’ Second, we have already seen that the
members of an Aristotelian species inherit properties from their ances-
tors and pass them on to their descendants according to the principles
set out in GA 4.3. As to (4), one might argue that even if Aristotle did
recognize a struggle for existence, he certainly didn’t appreciate its
implications or recognize that this struggle is a direct result of the
tendency of populations to over-reproduce in an environment with finite
resources. However, this is certainly not incompatible with anything he
says. So far so good.
What about (3)? Did Aristotle hold that organic populations vary
with respect to their heritable traits? Clearly he did (as we have seen).
However, the trick is to show how this is compatible with Aristotle’s
views about the eternity of species. One way to do this would be to think
of the eternal species-form as a subset of those features that are capable
of being passed on in the act of reproduction (those that belong to the
individual ). On this reading, while a population’s
species-specific properties would remain constant over time, there will
be heritable variation in those other traits falling below the level of
species, such as eye color and hair color in humans. Mutations in these
properties would then open up the possibility for some evolutionary
change.58 However, this reading requires us to assume that organisms
possess a built-in mechanism that either prevents mutations from
occurring in its species-specific properties or else prevents those mutations
from being passed on in reproduction. And there is no indication that
Aristotle posits such mechanisms.
There is an alternative interpretation of Aristotle’s account of species
that allows for heritable variations within the eternal species-form itself.
According to Lennox, species-level properties such as ‘‘nose,’’ ‘‘eyes,’’
57 ibid.
58 Even without mutations, Aristotle allows for a degree of phenotypic plasticity with
respect to some (regularly occurring) non-essential traits. See, e.g., GA 5.6, 30–2: ‘‘The
reason for this is that it is a natural attribute of the species not to be of a single colour;
for the species is quite mobile in both directions.’’
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and ‘‘leg’’ do not pick out actual features of any particular human being
(as they would on the previous interpretation). Rather, they represent
what Lennox calls ‘‘features with range’’: possible ways that human
noses, human eyes, and human legs may be concretely realized in dif-
ferent individuals.59 On this reading, Socrates’ snub nose, blue eyes, and
short legs and Callias’ bulbous nose, brown eyes and long legs are two
concrete realizations of the same generic human features. In other words,
there is no ‘‘species-form’’ per se, only different versions of that form
concretely realized in different individuals.
What this means is that the ‘‘eternal’’ form (the form that is contin-
uously reproduced from one generation to the next) will display a certain
amount of phenotypic plasticity within a certain allowable range of
differences. This allowable range is defined by the creature’s environ-
ment. For example, all curlews have elongated beaks, which is essential
for their survival in their particular environment. However, the beaks of
individual curlews (which are all concrete realizations of this same gen-
eric feature) differ from one another along a finite continuum, or by what
Aristotle calls ‘‘the more and the less.’’ What this means is that while all
curlews have elongated beaks, some will have beaks that are slightly
longer or slightly more curved than others. The continuum of differences
here is finite in the sense that there is a fixed range of beak sizes and
shapes that will be suited for life in a curlew’s natural environment. If a
mutation occurs outside this allowable range, then the offspring will no
longer be adapted to its particular environment and so possessing that
feature will be detrimental to its ability to survive and reproduce.
From this perspective Aristotle’s account of inheritance allows for an
evolution of species by natural selection, since populations would
eventually be forced to adapt to a changing environment. For as the
environment changes, the allowable range of possible ways of realizing
the species-form changes.60 Here is where the essential difference
between Aristotle and Darwin lies. Although Aristotle was well aware
of the fact that an organism’s environment is infinitely complex, there is
good reason to suspect that he did not think the environment itself was
capable of undergoing change. In Aristotle’s cosmological system, the
motions of the heavenly bodies determine the nature of the sublunary
environment. And for Aristotle these celestial motions are eternal and
unchanging. The implication is that for Aristotle species are fixed, not
because individuals possess some sort of innate capacity to maintain the
species-form against all odds; rather, the fixity of the species is parasitic
59 Lennox, 2001, 160–81.
60 This much has also been suggested by Lennox, 2001, 178.
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on the fixity of the environment. Thus an evolution of species is ruled
out only on cosmological grounds. So it is Aristotle’s cosmology, not his
biology, that is ultimately incompatible with an evolutionary world-
view.
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